Hijacking .NET to Defend PowerShell by Rousseau, Amanda
Hijacking .NET to Defend PowerShell 
Amanda Rousseau 
Malware Research and Threat Intel 
Endgame, Inc. 
San Francisco, CA USA 
amanda@endgame.com 
 
Abstract—With the rise of attacks using PowerShell in the 
recent months, there has not been a comprehensive solution for 
monitoring or prevention. Microsoft recently released the 
AMSI solution for PowerShell v5, however this can also be 
bypassed. This paper focuses on repurposing various stealthy 
runtime .NET hijacking techniques implemented for 
PowerShell attacks for defensive monitoring of PowerShell. It 
begins with a brief introduction to .NET and PowerShell, 
followed by a deeper explanation of various attacker 
techniques, which is explained from the perspective of the 
defender, including assembly modification, class and method 
injection, compiler profiling, and C based function hooking.  Of 
the four attacker techniques that are repurposed for defensive 
real-time monitoring of PowerShell execution, intermediate 
language binary modification, JIT hooking, and machine code 
manipulation provide the best results for stealthy run-time 
interfaces for PowerShell scripting analysis.  
Keywords—PowerShell; .NET; Blue Team; 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Like software developers, malware authors seek to improve 
the versatility of their code and reduce code dependencies. From 
2012, the usage of .NET has become a popular choice in 
malware campaigns due to the framework’s multiplatform 
support, versatility, and reliability. A subset of these .NET based 
attacks use PowerShell, which is a command line scripting 
language built on the .NET framework. The malicious usage of 
PowerShell has become a pain point for many defenders because 
of the following reasons: (1) limiting the use of PowerShell is 
not practicable because developers and system administrators 
need it for their duties;  (2) scripting languages are often difficult 
to statically analyze in real time due to heavy obfuscation; (3) 
some attackers attempt to disable PowerShell logging or 
PowerShell detection.   
The primary contribution of this paper is an illustratation of 
four stealthy, real-time techniques for monitoring the execution 
of PowerShell scripts. These techniques are based on known 
.NET hijacking techniques and developer performance 
profiling. The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides 
a survey of .NET and PowerShell-based malware.  Section III 
reviews the .NET structures necessary to understand the 
methods presented. Section IV focuses specifically on 
PowerShell malicious techniques and the Anti-Malware Scan 
Interface (AMSI). Section V presents four techniques used to 
monitor real-time PowerShell exectution: (1) assembly 
modification,  (2) class and method injection, (3) compiler 
profiling, and (4) C-based function hooking. A comparative 
summary of each approach in addressing the defender’s goals 
is presented in Section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Microsoft released the .NET framework in 2002, with the 
original intent to provide developers a flexible programming 
language to remain agnostic across different versions of 
Windows and architectures. Malware authors slowly caught on 
to the advantages of the framework with malware populations 
growing dramatically in the last 5 years. In 2015, Kaspersky 
Labs [1] released a chart that demonstrated 1600% population 
growth in unique malware detections of .NET malware from 
2009 to 2015. Specifically, there was a sharp increase from 2010 
to 2012, starting from approximately 2.5 million and growing to 
a little under 10 million unique detections.  
A range of offensive frameworks that utilize PowerShell and 
.NET have facilitated this exponential growth. The timeline in 
Fig. 1 depicts these tools and malware from 2012 to 2017.  
Fig. 1. Timeline of Surveyed .NET/PowerShell Malware 
 
A. Phishing Campaigns 
The most widely used form of PowerShell attacks are 
phishing  campaigns that utilize scripting to transition from the 
first stage of the attack to the second stage payload. Examples 
of second stage payloads include PoweLiks [2], PowerSniff [3], 
PowerDuke [4] and the Hunter Exploit Kit [5]. For example, 
PoweLiks is typically delivered through a document containing 
an exploit or macro, which initializes the PoweLiks payload, a 
PowerShell script, to load and execute the inherent malicious 
 
code into memory [2].  These payloads remain small in size and 
parsimonious in dependencies. The payloads could be easily 
packaged and guised in documents, run agnostically on 
Windows platforms, while also evading traditional Portable 
Executable (PE) analysis by remaining in memory.  
B. Obfuscation 
Like all malware, PowerShell and .NET attacks have 
adopted various forms of analysis evasion techniques, with 
script obfuscation being a noteable one. Scripting languages 
typically remain in human-readable form, thus allowing  
defenders to easily identify malicious code. As this paper will 
discusses, Microsoft’s ASMI intercepts scriptblocks before 
script compilation, however this detection ingress point can be 
bypassed through creative PowerShell scripting obfuscation 
techniques. The readily available Invoke-Obfuscation source 
code provides attackers with ways to obfuscate strings within 
PowerShell objects through invoked expressions [6]. An 
example of this type of obfuscation can be seen in Fig. 2. This 
type of obfuscation has also been popular in email attachment 
phishing campaigns mentioned earlier.  
Fig. 2. Invoke-Obfuscation Example [6] 
In addition, .NET binaries are subject to the same openness 
as human-readable scripts in that they can be decompiled to a 
close approximation of the original human-readable source 
code. Code protection applications such as ConfuserEx [7] and 
.NET Reactor [8] seek to thwart reverse engineers from being 
able to analyze the original source code. The open source tool 
and the predecessor to ConfuserEx, Confuser, has been seen in 
the wild in the ransomware CoinVault. When CoinVault was 
decompiled, the original source code was obfuscated into 
strings by the Confuser referenced assembly [9]. An example 
of this obfuscation can be seen in Fig. 3. The commerical 
product .NET Reactor not only provides string obfuscation but 
also string encryption, anti-decompilation, control flow 
obfuscation, and anti-tampering features [8]. Some static binary 
analysis techniques applied to this heavily obfuscated code may 
may fail when the binaries are not able to be decompiled into 
generalized code useful for detection. 
Fig. 3. CoinVault obfuscated C# code [9] 
 
C. PowerShell Attack Frameworks 
Originally designed for task automation and configuration 
management, PowerShell is also useful for automating attacks 
and post-exploitation routines in offensive frameworks.  
Developed in 2012, PowerSploit [10] and Nishang [11] were 
some of the earliest PowerShell frameworks to offer a 
collections of scripts to automate tasks such as analysis evasion, 
remote execution, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and 
exfiltration. Fig.4 provides an example of PowerSploit’s 
module that uses PowerShell’s invoke scriptblock command to 
reflectively load and execute a PE binary into memory. Since 
then, PS>Attack [12] and the matured PowerShellEmpire [13] 
improve and propogate these PowerShell offensive techniques.  
The methods discussed in this paper will seek to address some 
of the analysis evasion techniques provided in these 
frameworks. 
Fig. 4. PowerSploit: Invoking-Reflective PE Injection 
 
III. THE FOUNDATIONS OF .NET 
This section provides a review of the .NET framework which 
includes the foundational roles of the Common Language 
Runtime (CLR) library, Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler, the 
managed code of “Strong Named” assemblies, native code 
generated assemblies, decompiling .NET binaries, and specifics 
of intermediate langage codes. 
Fig. 5. .NET Framework Platform Overview 
 
A. Common Language Runtime (CLR) 
Unmanaged code languages like C/C++ are considered 
unsafe because the developer has to account for issues like API 
versioning and memory clean up. On the other hand, managed 
code like C# utilizes a common language runtime (CLR) handler 
that manages dependencies, memory, exceptions, and 
synchronization. The core of the .NET framework uses CLR to 
manage compiled code called assemblies. These assemblies are 
comprised of multiple modules that are defined by metadata and 
program logic stored as binary code in an intermediate language 
(IL). Fig. 5 provides an overview of the relationship between C# 
code compiled to a managed assembly, and then handled by the 
CLR to JIT compile IL code into native code instructions. After 
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $RemoteScriptBlock -
ArgumentList @($PEBytes, $FuncReturnType, $ProcId, 
$ProcName,$ForceASLR) 
the newly compiled native code is stored in memory and the 
lookup table updated, the method no longer needs to be 
compiled by JIT. Future method calls will jump directly to that 
memory block of native code to execute. 
Fig. 6 depicts a C# function while Fig. 7 is the equivalent 
function assembled in IL code. The metadata of the assembly 
provides the location to this method’s code.  In this form, the 
CLR is able to determine dependencies at runtime and execute 
as needed. One characteristic to note is that no additional 
information is required in the registry or in Active Directory 
Domain Services (AD DS) to deploy or execute referenced 
libraries [14]. In addition, assemblies remain agnostic across 
architectures because they are handled by the JIT compiler. 
Fig. 6. C# Code PowerShell ScriptBlock Create 
 
Fig. 7. IL Code PowerShell ScriptBlock Create 
 
B. Just-In-Time Compiler (JIT) 
The CLR uses an instance of JITCompiler to convert and 
optimize the IL code into native CPU instructions which are then 
stored in dynamic memory [14]. In Table I, it is important to 
note that CLR and JIT libraries are unmanaged and versioned 
for a particular architecture and release of .NET.  In Fig. 5, the 
CLR uses the function getJit() to acquire an instance of the 
JITCompiler object, the IL is then passed to the function 
compileMethod() that converts a class method. These 
JITCompiler functions are essentially the same in all versions. 
TABLE I.  CLR AND JIT UNMANAGED DLLS 
Type 
.NET Versions 
v2 - v3.5 (2.0.50727) v4+ (4.0.30319, 4.5, 4.6) 
CLR mscorwks.dll  clr.dll 
JIT mscorjit.dll clrjit.dll 
 
In order to compile the IL code of a method, the compiler 
must first know the location. An assembly contains metadata 
sections that describe the IL structures of each defined and 
referenced object. Table II provides a sampling of theses 
metadata tables. This section focuses on the relationship 
between class methods and the JITCompiler. Fig. 8 
demonstrates the order of operations the JITCompiler uses to 
refer to the MethodDef or the MemberRef metadata tables.  
These tables have entries that contain tokens representing offset 
locations for methods in the module of an assembly. Note that 
these tokens are unique only inside of a module. A call directive 
in IL code will refer to these method tokens. 
TABLE II.  METADATA TABLES [14] 
Metadata Table Description 
ModuleDef (0x00) Identity of the module 
TypeDef (0x01) List of class Types and the indexes to the methods that each class owns 
MethodDef (0x02) * Each method entry contains the name, offset location, flags, and signature. 
FieldDef (0x04) Contains one entry for every field defined in the module. 
ParamDef (0x06) Contains one entry for each parameter defined in the module. 
PropertyDef (0x17) Contains one entry for each property defined in the module. 
Assembly (0x20) Contains information about the current assembly.  
AssemblyRef (0x23) Contains information about the referenced assemblies. 
MemberRef (0x0A)* Contains each member including methods referenced by the module. 
Fig. 8. JITCompiler order of operation 
 
C. Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL) Codes 
Like CPU instructions, Microsoft created a CPU agnostic 
machine language with a more generic grammar than machine 
code [14]. This language uses the Common Language 
Infrastructure (CLI) instruction set standard from ECMA-335. 
IL codes are essentially basic bytecodes that represent 
instructions. For instance, in Fig. 9, the instruction to jump to a 
method is similar to x86 assembly language in that the JMP is 
one byte opcode and the address is a 4-byte value called a token.  
public static ScriptBlock Create(string script) 
{ 
      return ScriptBlock.Create(new Parser(), 
script); 
} 
.method /*06002149*/ public hidebysig static  
          class 
System.Management.Automation.ScriptBlock/*020003
16*/  
          Create(string script) cil managed 
  // SIG: 00 01 12 8C 58 0E 
  { 
    // Method begins at RVA 0xa9499 
    // Code size       12 (0xc) 
    .maxstack  8 
    IL_0000:  /*73|(06)001FDA*/ newobj     
instance void 
System.Management.Automation.Parser/*020002F7*/:
:.ctor() /*06001FDA*/ 
    IL_0005:  /*02|*/ ldarg.0 
    IL_0006:  /*28|(06)00214A*/ call class 
System.Management.Automation.ScriptBlock/*020003
16*/ 
System.Management.Automation.ScriptBlock/*020003
16*/::Create(class 
System.Management.Automation.Parser/*020002F7*/, 
                                                                                                                                                                               
string) /*0600214A*/ 
    IL_000b:  /*2A|*/ ret 
  } // end of method ScriptBlock::Create 
 
Fig. 9. Jump IL Instruction 
 
As mentioned earlier, a token is relevant to the module in the 
compiled assembly. This is important to note when trying to 
access method tokens outside an assembly. For example, the 
.NET framework provides the assembly System.Reflection.Emit 
and class MethodBuilder that allows a developer to compile 
methods solely from IL codes. If a newly IL compiled method 
were to reference a token outside an assembly, it would error 
and crash the program because that reference is not listed in the 
domain of the current assembly. Tokens are restricted to 4-byte 
values, as are arguments and local variables within any given  
method.  
 When the compiler optimizes the IL instructions for the 
CPU instruction execution, it means that any extraneous 
instructions such as NOP codes will be removed to improve 
performance [14]. As an example, when an attacker uses the 
MethodBuilder class to design creative IL obfuscation routines, 
the machine code execution may not resemble the original 
design. These optimized instructions are pushed and popped on 
the stack as needed. An example of this stack based usage can 
be seen Fig. 7, the IL method attribute “.maxstack” refers the 
stack slot size needed for arguments and local variables to the 
method [15]. Because these variables are referenced on the stack 
there is no need to modify registers to store variables. The 
compiler will look up the method entry point and jump to the 
next code block. After a method is JITed, one can acquire the 
virtual memory address of the method. This address can be 
acquired by using the runtime helper library using 
GetFunctionPointer. 
D. Decompiling .NET Binaries 
Like Java binaries, .NET binaries can easily be decompiled 
and disassembled. Some of the recommended tools include 
dotPeek [16], dnSpy [17], ILspy [18], and de4dot [19]. In 
addition, the .NET framework and SDK provides IL assembly 
and disassembly tools called ILAsm.exe and ILDasm.exe.  Many 
of these tools rely on disassembling the IL code and 
reconstructing the C# code based on the metadata definition and 
referenced tables mentioned in Table II. A decompiler can 
reconstruct the source code based on the object information’s 
original function names, function offsets, and membership to the 
parent classes. IL is standardized across all CLRs, this code can 
easily be converted back to the original source code routines. 
E. Strong Name Assemblies 
To fix version dependency, .NET uses uniquely identified 
assemblies called Strong Name assemblies. These assemblies 
are signed with a publisher’s public/private key pair that 
uniquely identifies the assembly’s publisher [14]. To reference 
the assembly, it uses a public key token which is a hash value 
derived from the public key. Fig. 10 provides an example of a 
public key token for the assembly for mscorlib. The signature 
and public key is embedded into the header of the assembly. 
Signing the assembly not only makes it unique but was also 
intended to be tamper-resistant [14].  
Fig. 10. Public Key Token Reference for Mscorlib 
 
Assemblies that are not Strong Named, sometimes called 
Weak Named assemblies [14], are typically searched for by file 
name and executable extension within the containing folder. 
Strong Named assemblies are typically placed into a globally 
accessible location in the file system called the Global Assembly 
Cache (GAC). To install an assembly globally, the .NET 
framework tool provides the gacutil.exe. 
Fig. 11. Typical GAC location 
 
Contrary to the anti-tampering characteristics of signed 
assemblies, starting with the .NET Framework version 3.5 
Service Pack 1 (SP1), Strong Name signatures are not validated 
when an assembly is loaded [20]. If a Strong Named assembly 
DLL were to be modified and installed using the gacutil.exe, it 
would fail to load. However, if the modified assembly were to 
be copied directly over the filesystem location of an already-
installed assembly, such as in the GAC_MSIL directory in Fig. 
11, no signature checks are performed. .NET will blindly load 
the DLL based on its filesystem location. The original researcher 
Metula, has already reported this feature to Microsoft. 
Regardless, one can still disable Strong Name signature 
verification in the Windows registry and application 
configuration [21]. Table III provides the configurations to 
disable the signature verification. 
TABLE III.  DISABLING STRONG NAME SIGNATURE VERIFICATION 
Arch Windows Registry Key to Disable for All Applications 
32 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\AllowStrongNameBypass 
64 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFr
amework\AllowStrongNameBypass 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Micr
osoft\.NETFramework\AllowStrongNameBypass 
C# Application Configuration for One Application 
<configuration>   
  <runtime>   
     <bypassTrustedAppStrongNames enabled="false" />   
  </runtime>   
</configuration> 
F. Native Image Generated Assemblies (NGEN) 
To further improve performance, the .NET framework SDK 
ngen.exe offers a solution to precompile assemblies into native 
code. This saves the CLR time from recompiling each class 
method over again because it would need to load the assembly 
through the JIT compiler. During runtime, the CLR first checks 
to see if a precompiled assembly already exists in the Native 
Image GAC locations. These Native Images won’t be as highly 
optimized as it the original compiled IL would be through a JIT 
compiler.  
JMP Type Token Method Token 
0x27 Little Endian 4 Byte Order 
.assembly extern /*23000001*/ mscorlib 
{ 
  .publickeytoken = (B7 7A 5C 56 19 34 E0 89 )                          
  .ver 2:0:0:0 
}
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Assembly\GAC
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Assembly\GAC_32
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Assembly\GAC_64
%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.NET\Assembly\GAC_MSIL
IV. POWERSHELL 
This section provides an overview of PowerShell, 
summarizes evasive techniques used in PowerShell offensive 
frameworks, and explains the ASMI module introduced in 
PowerShell version 5.  
PowerShell is a powerful scripting language that allows a 
user to: 
• directly access globally cached .NET assemblies,  
• reflectively load .NET assemblies which can load C-
based Windows libraries, 
• run unsigned scripts locally, and 
• run scripts that are interpreted and executed as base64 
strings. 
Script objects are processed in a class type called a 
ScriptBlock. Essentially all string or stream based scripts are 
parsed and compiled within a ScriptBlock. This is one of the 
ingress points for accessing PowerShell command classes. 
Using a decompiler such as dotPeek you can see the original 
structure of the ScriptBlock class. Fig. 6 is an example of the 
create method within the ScriptBlock class type. Note that this 
class offers different methods in different version of PowerShell. 
A. Globally Accessible Library 
As explained in Section III, libraries in .NET called 
assemblies can be cached globally for all applications to access. 
To use PowerShell, a user can either use the command line 
interface provided by PowerShell.exe (Fig. 12) or reference the 
cached global assembly in C# source code (Fig. 13). The GAC 
assembly name used in both cases is called 
System.Management.Automation.dll. Table IV provides an 
overview of PowerShell versions in relation to the default 
Windows version release as well as the minimum .NET 
framework prerequisite. Even though the .NET framework 
manages these assemblies, methods employed in this paper 
focus on the unmanaged code levels and therefore the version 
of .NET is necessary to track. 
Fig. 12. PowerShell Console 
 
TABLE IV.  POWERSHELL VERSIONS 
PS 
Version Released 
Default Windows 
Versions 
.NET CLR 
Versions 
1.0 2006 WinServer 2008 2.0.50727 
2.0 2009 Win7 WinServer 2008 R2 2.0.50727 
PS 
Version Released 
Default Windows 
Versions 
.NET CLR 
Versions 
3.0 2012 Win8 WinServer 2012 
4.0.30319 
4.5+ 
4.0 2013 Wuin8.1 WinServer 2012 R2 
4.0.30319 
4.5+ 
5.0 2014 Win10 4.5+ 
B. Runspaces 
The PowerShell class Runspaces allows C# code to invoke 
PowerShell commands. Fig. 13 is the SharpPick module in the 
PowerSploit offensive framework that uses the Runspace class 
to pipe the PE executable command line arguments to a 
PowerShell invoke command. A developer can convert any 
.NET PE binary into an interface for running PowerShell 
scripts. 
Fig. 13. PowerSploit: SharpPick C# binary using PowerShell 
 
C. Invoking 
PowerShell offers commands such as Invoke-Expression 
and Invoke-Command that will execute piped string input or a 
ScriptBlock in the local or remote shell contexts. When an 
invoke is called in PowerShell v5, the ScriptBlock post-
processed data is sent to be compiled and executed which is 
handled by the ScriptCommandProcessor.  
D. Calling Windows APIs 
Because PowerShell is compiled using .NET, it can access 
.NET assemblies and can reflectively load C-based Windows 
DLLs. This means a developer can reference a native function 
address within a DLL and reference it as a dynamic method. 
Fig. 14 provides an example of loading the GetModuleHandle 
and GetProcAddress functions from Kernel32.dll by loading 
the GAC assembly System.dll. An attacker can perform typical 
C-based shellcode and DLL injection using .NET reflection to 
load Windows API libraries. 
Fig. 14. PowerSploit: Invoke-Shellcode 
 
E. PowerShell v5 Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI)  
In 2015, Microsoft announced the anti-malware scan 
interface (AMSI) solution provided in Windows 10 and 
PowerShell v5 [22]. Windows Defender applies detection on 
the following AMSI capabilities: 
• memory and stream scanning, 
• de-obfuscated plain code, and 
• detecting C# .NET usage of the PowerShell assembly. 
Fig. 15. Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) 
The client AMSI module is referenced within the 
PowerShell assembly to intercept all script code to be scanned 
prior to compilation and execution. The intent of the scan 
interface is to allow Windows Defender and third party anti-
virus solutions to access the script code. Fig. 15 provides an 
overview of where the AMSI interception happens in the 
PowerShell’s assembly DLL. When the script code is ready to 
be compiled, it calls the scan interface from the AMSI.dll. The 
AMSI.dll handles the COM interface that sends the script data 
to be scanned by Windows Defender. The result is returned to 
PowerShell to either block or approve the script as a Boolean 
value. 
ASMI is useful for stopping various attacks such as 
execution of scripts without the use of PowerShell.exe. This 
technique was mentioned in Fig. 13 in the usage of 
PowerSploit’s SharpPick module. In addition, it can help detect 
.NET reflection, application whitelisting bypasses, scripts 
loaded from WMI namespaces, Registry keys, and Event 
logging.  
1) Signature Bypass and Disabling AMSI 
Despite all these types of techniques being blocked, several 
offensive researchers have found ways to bypass detection. A 
security researcher, Mittal, noted that Windows Defender relies 
on known variable names to block a malicious script [23]. By 
using creative string obfuscation on the variable name in 
replace of the indicator function names, it can bypass the 
signature detection. In addition, AMSI provides a command to 
disable the real-time monitoring for Windows Defender [23]. 
This configuration can be set using PowerShell as shown in Fig. 
16. 
Fig. 16. Disable AMSI using Set-MpPreference 
 
Fig. 17. Fake AMSI.DLL 
 
2) DLL Load Hijacking 
Another researcher discovered that the AMSI.dll can be 
unloaded from the current domain using a DLL load hijacking 
technique [24]. The tool p0wnshell was trying to load the 
AMSI.dll in the local executing directory. The bypass solution 
was essentially placing a fake copy of the ASMI.dll in this local 
directory. The PowerShell assembly call to the ASMI assembly 
was replaced with a dummy function so that it could not 
  # Get a reference to System.dll in the GAC 
        $SystemAssembly = 
[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | 
            Where-Object { $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -
And $_.Location.Split('\\')[-1].Equals('System.dll') 
} 
        $UnsafeNativeMethods = 
$SystemAssembly.GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativ
eMethods') 
        # Get a reference to the GetModuleHandle and 
GetProcAddress methods 
        $GetModuleHandle = 
$UnsafeNativeMethods.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle') 
        $GetProcAddress = 
$UnsafeNativeMethods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress') 
        # Get a handle to the module specified 
        $Kern32Handle = 
$GetModuleHandle.Invoke($null, @($Module)) 
        $tmpPtr = New-Object IntPtr 
        $HandleRef = New-Object 
System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef($tmpPtr, 
$Kern32Handle) 
PS C:\> Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 
$true 
 
 
forward ScriptBlock data to Windows Defender. Fig. 17 is the 
dummy contents of the fake AMSI.dll used in this bypass. 
3) Assembly Field Modification 
Assembly field modification is another AMSI bypass 
feature highlighted by an offensive security researcher, Graeber 
[23]. Using .NET reflection, a user can modify values within a 
class. When the AmsiUtils class is loaded, the class 
initialization failure result can be modified to appear as though 
initialization failed by setting it to $true. Fig. 18 is the 
PowerShell command used to run this bypass while Fig. 19 is 
the actual code snippet where this value is being set in the 
AMSI library. 
Fig. 18. PowerShell to Disable AMSI by Setting AmsiInitFailed 
  
Fig. 19. AMSI Integration code 
 
V. METHODS  
The defensive goal is to monitor PowerShell malicious script 
execution in a way that: 
• allows PowerShell to run in a normal environment, 
• analyzes deobfuscated commands, 
• remains stealthy in the environment to avoid bypasses, 
• allows run-time analysis and blocking, and 
• supports PowerShell v2-5. 
This section covers methodologies used for setting up the 
analysis code and exploring four solutions for addressing these 
goals. The methodologies include designing the managed and 
unmanaged libraries used in DLL injection, and C# class 
injection concepts. Solutions include direct managed assembly 
binary modification, CLR performance profiling, JIT compiler 
method hooking, and C-based method hooking. 
Creating a stealthy defensive solution requires that the 
system should remain both hidden from the user as well as the 
attacker. This means that there should be very few filesystem 
and registry artifacts existing in the environment and there 
should be no statically named binaries or references to the 
inserted libraries. Taking a cue from attacker techniques, user-
land rootkits offers a basis for developing stealthy software. 
Certain rootkits use dynamic DLL injection to insert themselves 
into target processes. However, in this scenario, the injected 
DLL has the authority to access the process. The DLL should 
not be injected into every process. Instead it should be injected 
only into those selected processes using a driver that registers an 
image load notify routine. Using characteristics such as a .NET 
binary’s header information that contains the CLR information 
is just one example of a useful identifier for these target 
processes. This section does not focus on the driver 
implementation, but only on preparing the injection DLL for 
deployment. 
A. C# DLL Injection Usage 
To run an injected C# assembly DLL, it must be first 
wrapped in a C-based wrapper DLL. The C# DLL does not have 
a DllMain() function which is needed to call 
DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH or DLL_THREAD_ATTACH 
directives. Note that this C-based DLL is considered 
unmanaged which means library, architecture, and compilation 
dependencies will need to be handled.  
After the DLL is injected and DllMain called, it is important 
to identify the version of CLR in the host process. Because C# 
is agnostic to architectures and versions, the host process uses 
the environment’s .NET version unless forced to an older 
version. Knowing that attackers force the use of an older 
PowerShell version means the DLL requires that it’s running 
within the same framework. The version is also needed to load 
the correctly compiled C# payload. There needs to be payloads 
compiled for each major version of .NET (2.0,3.5,4.0,4.5, and 
4.6). 
By using the API call GetModuleHandle or LoadLibrary, 
the injected DLL is able to get the mscoree.dll CLR library from 
the host process’s loaded libraries. Next the CLR and JIT 
version must be identified. As mentioned earlier, clr.dll, 
clrjit.dll, mscorwks.dll, and mscorjit.dll refer to specific major 
version of the .NET frameworks. If these libraries are not found 
in the environment, then the DLL should be unloaded properly 
and safely. Fig. 20 provides a sampling of this code. 
Fig. 20. Determining JIT Version from Host Process 
The next stage of this loading process involves loading the 
C# payload into the host process’s C# AppDomain. The 
AppDomain is the collection of assemblies loaded in the 
environment. As mentioned previously, the injected DLL 
should have the fewest possible external dependencies and 
artifacts. Using a precompiled C# payload and adding it as an 
embedded resource in the parent C-based DLL reduces the 
[Ref].Assembly.GetType(‘System.Management.Automation
.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,St
atic').SetValue($null,$true) 
int AMSIIntegration() 
{ 
   HAMSICONTEXT amsiContext; 
   HRESULT hres; 
 
   hres = CoInitializeEx(0, COINIT_MULTITHREADED); 
   hres = AmsiInitialize(L"Win32Project2", &amsiContext); 
   if (FAILED(hres)) 
   { 
      std::cout << "AmsiInitialize fails" << std::endl; 
      CoUninitialize(); 
      return -1; // Program has failed. 
   } 
static DWORD WINAPI launcher(void* h) 
{ 
    try 
    { 
        LoadLibrary(_T("mscoree.dll")); 
 
        // find the JIT module 
        g_hJitModule = LoadLibrary(_T("clrjit.dll")); 
        if (!g_hJitModule) 
        { 
            g_hJitModule = LoadLibrary(_T("mscorjit.dll")); 
        } 
        if (g_hJitModule == NULL) 
        { 
            OutputDebugString(L"Status_Error_JITNotFound"); 
            throw "Status_Error_JITNotFound"; 
        } 
 
footprint. Once added as a binary resource file, the launcher 
function is able to load the assembly as a byte array. 
Next the DLL needs to access the CLR environment of the 
host process. By including mscoree.h and mscorlib.tlb, the C-
based code can access functions typically used in the C# 
environments for accessing the AppDomain structure. Using 
COM, the launcher uses CoCreateInstance to access the CLR 
runtime environment of the host process as shown in Fig. 21. 
Once there is a reference to the host process AppDomain, the 
launcher can use the Load function to load the byte array C# 
payload as shown in Fig. 22.  
Fig. 21. Initializing the Host CLR Environment using COM 
 
Fig. 22. Loading Byte Array DLL into AppDomain 
 
 
Finally, the C# payload will need to be initialized. Because 
the C# payload DLL does not have a DllMain, it must use a 
COM visible interface in the target class to be called by the C-
based DLL as shown in Fig. 23. The SetupAppDomain function 
should ensure that the current domain of the C# payload is 
added to the domain of the host process. 
Fig. 23. COM Visible Interface 
 
Fig. 24. Current Domain Resolution 
 
Now that the COM visible interface is established, the C-
based DLL can initialize the interfaced class and call one of its 
members SetupAppDomain() as shown in Fig. 25. In summary, 
the C-based DLL loads the C# payload DLL as a byte array 
resource and load it into the host process domain by using 
mscoree objects and COM interfaces. 
Fig. 25. Initializing Target Class and Method 
 
B. Implemented Solutions 
The four solutions presented in this section were originally 
researched as offensive techniques for performance profiling 
purposes. This section illustrates the advantages and limitations 
of each solution in relation to the defensive goals. 
1) Direct IL Binary Modification 
In 2009, Metula presented a BlackHat conference talk about 
developing .NET framework rootkits [20]. The methodology 
involves targeting a GAC assembly to decompile the binary into 
its IL code, modify the IL code by injecting functions, 
recompiling the IL, and force the framework to use the modified 
DLL. As mentioned in Section III, Metula discovered that the 
assembly signature is not actually verified when loaded in .NET 
v3.5 and the modified DLL can be overwritten into the GAC 
location. In addition to the signature verification hurdle, it is 
recommended that NGEN assemblies should be uninstalled 
because an NGEN assembly will bypasses the JIT compiler, and 
the order of assembly loading first looks for native image 
assemblies for IL based assemblies. 
To apply this rootkit technique for PowerShell, a defender 
can modify the existing C# compiled GAC assembly 
System.Management.Automation.dll to apply method 
interception. Essentially the modification would involve 
disassembling the assembly, then inserting a helper class that 
can load another C# assembly that contains the interception 
code. Fig. 26 provides a high-level diagram of this process. The 
interception code should provide the bulk of the processing 
similar to AMSI client assembly. The target method to monitor 
should have a call function to the newly accessible assembly. 
Here you can perform analysis on any function arguments 
similar to traditional Windows API hooking. Note the 
characteristics of IL code in relation to the metadata, IL token 
offsets, and stack sizes. There are risks in modifying the existing 
code and not accounting for proper assembly loading and offset 
location mistakes. Note that the modified assembly should not 
hinder the execution of legitimate processes and users. 
CoInitializeEx(0, COINIT_MULTITHREADED); 
ICorRuntimeHost* pICorRuntimeHost = 0; 
HRESULT st = CoCreateInstance(CLSID_CorRuntimeHost, 0, 
CLSCTX_ALL, IID_ICorRuntimeHost, (void**)&pICorRuntimeHost); 
if (!pICorRuntimeHost) { 
        OutputDebugString(L"Failed."); 
        return 1; 
} 
HDOMAINENUM hEnum = NULL; 
pICorRuntimeHost->EnumDomains(&hEnum); 
if (!hEnum) { 
        OutputDebugStringA("Failed."); 
        return 1; 
} 
IUnknown* pUunk = 0; 
st = pICorRuntimeHost->NextDomain(hEnum, &pUunk); 
if (!pUunk) { 
        OutputDebugStringA("Failed."); 
        return 1; 
} 
CComPtr<mscorlib::_AppDomain> pAppDomain = NULL; 
st = pUunk->QueryInterface( __uuidof( 
CComPtr<mscorlib::_AppDomain>), (VOID**)&pAppDomain); 
if (!pAppDomain) { 
        OutputDebugStringA("Failed."); 
        return 1; 
} 
 
LPSAFEARRAY lpAsmblyData = GetClrHookDllAsSafeArray(h); 
 
CComPtr<mscorlib::_Assembly> pAssembly; 
HRESULT hr = pAppDomain->Load_3(lpAsmblyData, &pAssembly); 
SafeArrayDestroy(lpAsmblyData); 
 
namespace InjectionHelper 
{ 
    [InterfaceType(ComInterfaceType.InterfaceIsIUnknown)] 
    [Guid("D9A7CDDF-75EF-4988-9C9D-4FD00A0B9363")] 
    [ComVisible(true)] 
    public interface ITargetInit 
    { 
        [ComVisible(true)] 
        void SetupAppDomain(); 
    } 
public void SetupAppDomain() 
{ 
   AppDomain.CurrentDomain.AssemblyResolve += 
DomainAssemblyResolve; 
   DllMain(); 
} 
 
CComVariant variant; 
_ComOp(pAssembly->CreateInstance( 
_bstr_t(L"InjectionHelper.TargetInit"), &variant)); 
CComPtr<ITranpolineInit> pTargetInit; 
_ComOp(variant.punkVal->QueryInterface( 
__uuidof(ITargetInit), (void**)&pTargetInit)); 
        hr = pTargetInit->SetupAppDomain(); 
 
To reduce human error from manual IL code manipulation, 
there are libraries and tools available to handle the rewriting and 
injection of code into assemblies. These tools include .NET-
Sploit [20], Mono.Cecil [25], and dotNetHookLibrary [26]. 
Mono.Cecil is a library that provides a user the ability to load 
existing assemblies either statically or dynamically to modify 
the IL code to insert new code. This is a well-known tool used 
by both developers and gaming hackers to patch deployed .NET 
based binaries. In comparison, the dotNetHookLibrary is 
designed to modify original static assemblies by inserting 
hooking code into specified methods. 
Fig. 26. IL Code Insertion 
While these tools provide the most flexibility, this technique 
is essentially modifying the original binary. Trying to perform 
application whitelisting in the environment might be 
troublesome because the file can no longer be verified. In 
addition, if an attacker is thorough, they might also be able to 
identify if the original DLL has been modified based on 
signature verification or file hash. On the other hand, this 
modified assembly would only be deployed at runtime by 
another process. Attackers would also need to be able to acquire 
this modified assembly to reverse and bypass it. 
2) CLR Profiling 
The .NET framework provides its own CLR performance 
monitoring API to evaluate the runtime performance of JITed IL 
code. Some benefits of this API are that it monitors the execution 
of the .NET application and allows tighter control over the CLR 
and JIT environment.  A project by Dupius provides a 
developer’s perspective to monitoring code execution in that he 
employed the performance monitoring API to perform CLR 
dynamic hook injection [27]. In this setup, the testing harness 
uses the CLR hosting library to load CLR into an unmanaged 
hosted process. By controlling the CLR loading using 
CorBindToRuntimeEx, the target host process uses the specified 
CLR version as opposed to the default version used in the 
environment. An example of this configuration can be seen in 
Fig. 27.  
To enable the profiling API, the environment variables 
COR_ENABLE_PROFILING and COR_PROFILER need to be 
set to a registered dll of the customized Profiler as seen in Fig. 
28. Fig. 29 provides an overview of how the testing harness acts 
as an the environment controller and event receiver in relation 
to the the custom CLR profiler interfacing the target process’s 
CLR and loads the runtime hooking C# library.  
 Fig. 27. Specifying the CLR environment 
 
Fig. 28. Defining the CLR Profiler 
 
Fig. 29. CLR Profiler Dynamic DLL Hook Injection 
As mentioned in Sec. V-A on DLL injection, the hooking 
assembly needs to be loaded into the AppDomain of the target 
process to run. Using the interfaces provided by the profiler, the 
C# assembly can be reflectively loaded. The CLR profiler API 
essentially accesses the Metadata emitter API to monitor 
performance. This means when an assembly or module is 
loaded or unloaded it will track the event. This feature is useful 
in monitoring PowerShell. When the System.Management.-
Automation.dll is loaded in the AppDomain, the Profiler can 
access the assembly and target class methods in runtime. An 
example of this event function can be seen in Fig. 30. 
When the profiling event occurs for assembly loading, the 
hook should be installed. With the C# hooking library already 
loaded into the host domain, the next step is to acquire the token 
for the target method, the hook prototype method, and the 
trampoline method. Fig. 31 provided a logical view of the 
hooking mechanism. Before the hooking mechanism can be set 
up, the trampoline method needs to be built and compiled. Fig. 
32 is the IL code of the trampoline method which called a 
reference to the hook prototype method. By using 
SetILFunctionBody, the profiler is able to patch the original 
body of the method code. With the original code replaced with 
a new trampoline method, the trampoline calls the hook 
prototype method and then return to the original target method. 
 
CComPtr<ICLRRuntimeHost> rtHost; 
hr= CorBindToRuntimeEx(L"v2.0.50727”,NULL,0,
 CLSID_CLRRuntimeHost,IID_ICLRRuntimeHost,(LPVOID*)&
rtHost); 
BOOL r; 
r =SetEnvironmentVariable(L"COR_ENABLE_PROFILING",L"1"); 
r =SetEnvironmentVariable(L"COR_PROFILER", 
 L"{139008CF-ED57-49c1-B840-2DEA89B6C76C}"); 
  
Fig. 30. ModuleLoadFinished CLR Profiler 
 
Being able to hook methods in a class allows the flexibility 
to follow execution beyond string signature analysis. The 
dynamic execution of PowerShell assembly methods offers a 
precise scope when going after detections malicious routines. 
While this presents a viable solution, it also has the same 
limitations as IL binary modification in that it requires 
assemblies to run through the CLR to be JITed. If the target 
assembly is installed as NGEN it will bypass the JIT stage, and 
one would be unable to JIT methods in IL during run-time. 
3) JIT Compiler Hooking 
This section illustrates another form of dynamic hook 
injection. Instead of using the CLR profiler API to set up the 
environment, this JIT compiler solution relies on DLL injection 
and manually determining the CLR environment in the host 
process. Another developer, Wang, provides the base research 
for this JIT hooking technique [28]. The original intent was to 
modify methods on the fly so that a developer can test inputs 
for methods without being invasive to the code.  
 
 
Fig. 31. Target, Hooked, and Trampoline Method 
 
Fig. 32. IL Code Trampoline Method 
 
 
struct injectorTranpoline { 
 BYTE methodHeader; // TINY format header 
  
 BYTE ilCall01; 
 DWORD refTranpoline; 
 BYTE ilRet; 
  
 injectorTranpoline(mdMethodDef tkClrHook) 
 { 
  ilCall01  = 0x28; 
  refTranpoline = tkClrHook; 
  ilRet   = 0x2A; 
  
  methodHeader = 
CorILMethod_TinyFormat|((sizeof(injectorTranpoline)-
1)<<(CorILMethod_FormatShift-1)); 
 } 
}; 
 
STDMETHODIMP CClrProbeProfiler::ModuleLoadFinished(  
/* [in] */ ModuleID moduleId, 
/* [in] */ HRESULT hrStatus)  
{  
   if(FAILED(hrStatus)) return S_OK; 
 
   try 
   { 
      AssemblyID assemblyId; 
      wchar_t wszModule   [512]; 
      wchar_t wszAssembly   [512]; 
      LPCBYTE    ppBaseLoadAddress; 
      DWORD cchAssembly   = sizeof(wszAssembly)/sizeof(wszAssembly[0]); 
      DWORD cchModule      = sizeof(wszModule)/sizeof(wszModule[0]); 
 
      _ComOp( m_corInfos->GetModuleInfo  (moduleId,&ppBaseLoadAddress,cchModule,&cchModule,wszModule,&assemblyId) ); 
      _ComOp( m_corInfos->GetAssemblyInfo(assemblyId,cchAssembly,&cchAssembly,wszAssembly,NULL,NULL) ); 
 
      DBGNOT("CClrProbeProfiler::ModuleLoadFinished - ModuleID={0} [{1}] of AssemblyID={2} [{3}]") % moduleId % wszModule % 
assemblyId % wszAssembly; 
 
      if(!_wcsicmp(wszAssembly,L"System.Management.Automation.dll")) 
      { 
         DBGNOT("CClrProbeProfiler::ModuleLoadFinished - Instrument module"); 
         InstrumentModule(m_corInfos,moduleId); 
      } 
   } 
   catch(_com_error &e) 
   { 
      DBGERR("CClrProbeProfiler::ModuleLoadFinished - Get Module Name failed {0}") % e; 
      return E_FAIL; 
   } 
   return S_OK;  
} } 
 catch(_com_error &e) 
 { 
  DBGERR("CClrProbeProfiler::ModuleLoadFinished - Get Module Name failed {0}") % e; 
  return E_FAIL; 
 } 
 return S_OK;  
} 
Fig. 33. Hooking JIT from compileMethod 
Fig. 34 provides an overview of the different components 
involved in the JIT Compiler hooking technique. The process 
occurs as follows: 
1. An injector process injects the unmanaged wrapper 
DLL into the target process. 
2. The wrapper DLL determines the version of CLR and 
JIT to acquire the method offsets for hooking. 
3. Using a C-based hooking library called EasyHook the 
JIT’s compileMethod functions installs a hook to a 
prototype of compileMethod. (see Fig. 35) 
4. Now load the C# hooking library into the AppDomain 
of the target process. 
5. Update the IL code to install the trampoline method to 
the C# hooked prototype method. 
In this setup, there is no longer control on the CLR 
environment of the host and child process. The wrapper DLL 
needs to determine if CLR and JIT is even loaded to determine 
the function offsets of the JIT compiler and to load the C# 
hooking library.  One way to gather function offsets is by 
downloading the debugging database (.pdb) for all known 
versions of JIT and extracting the required JIT methods, the 
DLL can store a resource library of function offsets. Fig. 36 
provides an example of these function offset files. 
Fig. 34. CLR Profiler Dynamic DLL Hook Injection 
 
 
Fig. 35. JIT Hooking compileMethod() 
 
Fig. 36. Function Offsets for JIT 
 
The purpose of these functions is to acquire the information 
from the MethodDef metadata definitions of the assembly. 
These function references are needed to satisfy the libraries 
referenced by the prototype hook function for compileMethod 
in the JIT compiler. The compileMethod is important to 
monitor methods being JITed at runtime and to insert hooking 
IL code to be compiled during runtime.   
D971C845B82D877107906335EFF1824C#32_2_0_50727_8670 
2621605;MethodDesc::s_pfnReset 
55606;MethodDesc::s_pfnIsGenericMethodDefinition 
60512;MethodDesc::s_pfnGetNumGenericMethodArgs 
762227;MethodDesc::s_pfnStripMethodInstantiation 
60894;MethodDesc::s_pfnHasClassOrMethodInstantiation 
160213;MethodDesc::s_pfnContainsGenericVariables 
1179150;MethodDesc::s_pfnGetWrappedMethodDesc 
56056;MethodDesc::s_pfnGetDomain 
1020785;MethodDesc::s_pfnGetLoaderModule 
4801122;LoadedMethodDescIterator::s_pfnConstructor 
0;LoadedMethodDescIterator::s_pfnConstructor_v45 
0;LoadedMethodDescIterator::s_pfnConstructor_v46 
4950262;LoadedMethodDescIterator::s_pfnStart 
0;LoadedMethodDescIterator::s_pfnNext_v4 
4950393;LoadedMethodDescIterator::s_pfnNext_v2 
4950297;LoadedMethodDescIterator::s_pfnCurrent_F43F70A
F86B02890FCF95ED91EA373BB#32_4_0_30319_17929 
_1BC333D76444B51B01A74B7447ADBC9E#64_2_0_50727_4963
  
//Set Jit 
p_getJit = (ULONG_PTR *(__stdcall *)()) GetProcAddress(g_hJitModule, "getJit"); 
 
if (p_getJit) 
{ 
   ICorJitCompiler::Instance = (ICorJitCompiler *)*((ULONG_PTR *)p_getJit()); 
   if (ICorJitCompiler::Instance) 
   { 
       DWORD OldProtect; 
       VirtualProtect(ICorJitCompiler::Instance, sizeof(ULONG_PTR), PAGE_READWRITE, &OldProtect); 
                compileMethodcache = ICorJitCompiler::Instance->compileMethodintercept; 
                ICorJitCompiler::Instance->compileMethodintercept = &ICorJitCompiler::compileMethod; 
                VirtualProtect(ICorJitCompiler::Instance, sizeof(ULONG_PTR), OldProtect, &OldProtect); 
                 
                //Set Hook 
                ICorJitCompiler::PFN_compileMethod pfnCompileMethod = &ICorJitCompiler::compileMethod; 
                LPVOID * pAddr = (LPVOID*)&pfnCompileMethod; 
                NTSTATUS ntStatus = LhInstallHook( 
                    (PVOID&)ICorJitCompiler::Instance->compileMethodintercept, 
                    *pAddr, 
                    NULL, 
                    &s_hHookCompileMethod); 
 
                ULONG ulThreadID = GetCurrentProcessId(); 
                LhSetExclusiveACL(&ulThreadID, 1, &s_hHookCompileMethod); 
 
                if (ntStatus != STATUS_SUCCESS) 
                { 
                    throw "Failed to hook the API"; 
                } 
                Inspection::s_nStatus = Inspection::Status_Ready; 
            } 
        } 
 Fig. 37 provides an example of the prototype function used 
to hook the compileMethod. Like the CLR profile API, you can 
acquire the names of the methods being JITed for the first time 
in the function. Fig. 38 provides an example of how these 
methods are accessed from the method information. When this 
is applied to monitoring the System.Management.-
Automation.dll in PowerShell, it can monitor when each method 
is being JITed for the first time. Fig. 39 provides an example of 
PowerSploit’s SharpPick being monitored in this fashion. 
As with the first two solutions, this JIT hooking approach 
relies on being able to JIT the IL code. The NGEN native image 
assembly for PowerShell needs to be uninstalled. Note that 
compiling IL code by the compileMethod function is very 
restrictive in that one needs to determine the right method token 
to jump to if the target method is not within the same module or 
assembly. 
Fig. 37. Function Offsets for JIT 
 
Fig. 38. Function Offsets for JIT 
 
Fig. 39. PowerShell Eventing From Hooking JIT 
 
4) Machine Code Memory Modification 
In 2015, Timzen presented a BlackHat talk illustrated the 
manipulation of .NET machine code in memory locations that 
were readable, writable, and executable after IL objects were 
JITed.  By using pointer reflection, a method’s post JITed 
machine code block pointer address could be accessed. Note that 
this pointer address is not the same as the token address of a pre-
JITed method. Fig. 40 presents the function call to acquire this 
pointer. Fig. 41 highlights where the hook is placed in the post-
JIT memory blocks. The assembly for Marshalling, called 
System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal, writes machine code 
in these memory blocks. Here you can administer machine code 
based trampolines and hooking. The difficulty in this technique 
is building the prototype functions for C# methods which are IL 
code and optimized after JITed. 
Fig. 40. GetFunctionPointer() 
 
Fig. 41. Hooking JIT from compileMethod 
 
VI. RESULTS 
Of the four solutions presented, the stealthier techniques are 
brittle and require tedious handling of version dependencies, 
while more-widely known techniques have a larger artifact 
footprint. Table V provides a summary of each solution’s 
fitness for the defender’s goals. Overall the IL binary 
Modification, JIT Hooking and Machine Code Manipulation 
solutions offered the best for stealthy runtime analysis. 
TABLE V.  SOLUTION RESULTS COMPARISON 
Requirements IL Binary Modification 
CLR 
Profiler 
Hooking 
JIT 
Hooking 
Machine Code 
Manipulation 
Runtime 
Analysis YES YES YES YES 
Runs with 
PowerShell 
v2+ 
YES YES YES YES 
Stealth vs. 
AMSI YES YES YES YES 
int __stdcall ICorJitCompiler::compileMethod( 
    ICorJitInfo * pJitInfo,  
    CORINFO_METHOD_INFO * pCorMethodInfo, 
    UINT nFlags,  
    LPBYTE * pEntryAddress,  
    ULONG * pSizeOfCode) 
{  
 
DisplayMethodAndCalls(pJitInfo, 
pCorMethodInfo); 
 
VOID DisplayMethodAndCalls( 
    ICorJitInfo *comp, 
    CORINFO_METHOD_INFO *info) 
{ 
    const char *szMethodName = NULL; 
    const char *szClassName = NULL; 
 
    szMethodName = comp->getMethodName(info->ftn, 
&szClassName); 
 
    char CurMethod[200]; 
 
    sprintf_s(CurMethod, 200, "%s::%s", szClassName, 
szMethodName); 
    OutputDebugStringA(CurMethod); 
 
0.13164930[2888] Microsoft.PowerShell.ToStringCodeMethods  
0.13168100[2888] Microsoft.PowerShell.AdapterCodeMethods  
0.13171920[2888] 
System.Management.Automation.SettingValueExceptionEventArgs  
0.13174960[2888] 
System.Management.Automation.GettingValueExceptionEventArgs  
0.13178501[2888] 
System.Management.Automation.PSObjectPropertyDescriptor  
0.13181540[2888] 
System.Management.Automation.PSObjectTypeDescriptor   
0.13184530[2888] 
System.Management.Automation.PSObjectTypeDescriptionProvider 
0.13187569[2888] 
System.Management.Automation.Runspaces.ConsolidatedString 
0.13192080[2888] 
System.Management.Automation.Runspaces.NodeCardinality   
0.13196360[2888] System.Management.Automation.Runspaces.Node 
0.13201410[2888] 
System.Management.Automation.Runspaces.Node+NodeMethod   
0.13204980[2888] 
System.Management.Automation.Runspaces.LoadContext  
  
MethodInfo commandCtor = 
targetType.GetMethod("ParseScriptBlock"); 
            
System.Runtime.CompilerServices.RuntimeHelpers.
PrepareMethod(commandCtor.MethodHandle); 
            IntPtr commandCtorPtr = 
commandCtor.MethodHandle.GetFunctionPointer(); 
 
Requirements IL Binary Modification 
CLR 
Profiler 
Hooking 
JIT 
Hooking 
Machine Code 
Manipulation 
System 
Artifacts? YES YES NO NO 
NGEN to Be 
Uninstalled YES YES YES YES 
Requires 
Signature 
Validation 
YES NO NO NO 
Difficulty High (If Manual) Low Medium High 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The .NET framework is a powerful framework for both 
developers and attackers constantly find creative avenues for 
code manipulation outside of its intended use. Based on this 
research, IL Binary Modification, JIT Hooking, and Machine 
Code Manipulation provided the best results in providing 
stealthy run-time interfaces for PowerShell scripting analysis.  
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